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Abstract
One sometimes believes that P without grasping that P. For ex-
ample, a complete achromat might believe that ripe tomatoes are red
without grasping this fact. My aim in this paper is to shed light on the
difference between merely believing a fact or proposition and grasp-
ing it. I focus on two possible theories of grasping: the inferential
theory, which explains grasping in terms of inferential role, and the
phenomenal theory, which explains grasping in terms of phenomenal
consciousness. I argue that the phenomenal theory is more plausible
than the inferential theory.1
1This paper will appear in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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The only reason the beverage people want sugar to be
measured in grams instead of teaspoons is that people
understand what a teaspoon is. No one understands the
metric system. [I]f [the FDA] really want[s] us to
understand how much sugar is in our food, they need to
find a measurement that we can immediately grasp. That is
why tonight we are proposing, in the spirit of Halloween,
that product manufacturers express their sugar content in
the form of candy, specifically, Circus Peanuts, the most
disgusting of all the candies.
John Oliver, This Week Tonight, October 26, 2014
There is a difference between believing a fact or proposition and grasping
it. The following case illustrates this distinction:
Jane had been smoking for over fifteen years. Thanks to the
government’s aggressive information campaign, she was fully in-
formed about the dangers of smoking, but this never compelled
her to quit. One day, a colleague of hers who was also a smoker
was diagnosed with lung cancer. Learning about her colleague’s
condition helped Jane grasp the dangers of smoking and made
her quit for good.
Jane quit smoking because learning about her colleague’s condition allowed
her to better appreciate the dangers of smoking. Crucially, this increased
appreciation was not a matter of acquiring new beliefs: since Jane was already
fully informed of the dangers of smoking, nothing she learned could have
warranted her change of behavior.2 Her increased appreciation was a matter
2The new beliefs that Jane acquired pertain to the fact that her colleague had cancer.
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of acquiring a better grasp of facts that she already believed.
Jane’s case seems to illustrate the fact that there is a mental act, grasping,
that goes beyond mere belief and knowledge and that plays a role in rational
behavior. A related observation has often been made in epistemology and
philosophy of science, where several theorists have argued that understanding
goes beyond mere knowledge because it involves grasping. For example,
Strevens writes:
... the sort of grasping needed for understanding requires a
more intimate acquaintance with the structure of the explanation
than sometimes accompanies mere knowledge. It is not enough
to know that one or more parts of, or conditions for, a correct
explanation hold; their holding must be directly mentally appre-
hended. ... What is grasping, or understanding that, or direct
apprehension, then? It is the fundamental relation between mind
and world, in virtue of which the mind has whatever familiarity it
does with the way the world is. The question of the nature of this
relation is perhaps the deepest in all philosophy; I will not try to
make any progress on it in this paper. (Strevens 2013, p. 511)
There seems to be considerable agreement that grasping is key to under-
standing and involves more than knowledge or belief, but very little has been
said about what grasping is.3 In this paper I will try to shed some light on
She was aware all along that by smoking she was greatly increasing her chances of devel-
oping a cancer, and she was aware that this risk assessment was derived from data about
millions of individuals. She was also aware that a certain proportion of the smokers she
knew would likely develop a lung cancer. Learning about her colleague’s case should have
made no difference to her expectations with respect to smoking.
3Regarding the relationship between grasping, understanding, and knowledge, Kvan-
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this question from the perspective of the philosophy of mind. My aim is to
uncover what goes on in the mind when one grasps a proposition.
So little has been said about the nature of grasping that one might suspect
that there is nothing to explain, that “grasping” is just a metaphor. “Grasp-
ing” is a metaphor, but I believe that the use of this metaphor at least loosely
tracks an important phenomenon that deserves attention. Accordingly, my
first goal in this paper is to bring this phenomenon into focus, which I will
do by examining the role of grasping in a series of cases. Then I will ex-
plore possible theories of grasping. Two theories are naturally suggested
by salient features of grasping: the inferential theory and the phenomenal
vig (2003, p. 192) suggests that “understanding requires the grasping of explanatory and
other coherence-making relationships,” which goes beyond mere knowledge. According to
Zagzebski (2001, p. 244), “[u]nderstanding deepens our cognitive grasp of that which is
already known.” Grimm (2006, p. 532) writes: “... when trying to offer an account of
understanding the notion of grasping arises almost irresistibly. Moreover, when we grasp
some claim we are apparently doing something significantly different from merely saying
Yes to it ... it seems clear that one can pile up assents as high as you like without getting
a grasping.”
The fact that we lack a univocal, non-metaphorical way of designating grasping makes
it hard to keep track of relevant discussions, but I am aware of only three serious attempts
at explaining it: Nida-Rumelin 2006, Grimm 2011, and Wilkenfeld 2013. These proposals
fall under the umbrella of the inferential theory discussed below. Kvanvig (2003, p. 200)
and Zagzebski (2009) also make some relevant remarks in the course of discussing the
relationship between knowledge and understanding. Franklin (1983) attempts to analyze
the concepts of grasping and seeing (not the project I am pursuing here).
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theory. The inferential theory explains grasping in terms of inferential role,
broadly construed. The phenomenal theory explains it in terms of phenom-
enal consciousness. I will argue that the phenomenal theory offers the most
promising explanation of grasping. The main argument of this paper draws
significantly from, and adds to, the case for the view that consciousness is
central to cognition (Strawson 1994, 2000; Siewert 1998; Horgan & Tienson
2002; Kriegel 2003, 2011b; Pitt 2004, 2011; Farkas 2008a, 2008b; Chudnoff
2011b, 2013c, 2015; Smithies 2011a, 2011b, 2013b).
1 The explanandum
We can grasp entities of many different kinds, for example, facts, proposi-
tions, concepts, definitions, theories, structures, processes, and phenomena.
Here I will I focus on graspings of propositions.4 While I focus on graspings
of propositions, it seems reasonable to hope that all other kinds of grasping
might ultimately be reducible to graspings of propositions (a view that I will
not defend in this paper). For ease of exposition, I will assume that grasping
a fact is the same as grasping a true proposition.
The best way to get a good fix on grasping is to look at concrete examples
where its presence or absence makes a noticeable difference. Two kinds of
4I take propositions to be whatever complete thoughts represent. I will refer to propo-
sitions using ordinary English sentences in angled brackets, for example, “<There is an
apple>.”
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cases are particularly helpful for this purpose: transition cases and non-
grasping cases. Transition cases are cases in which one transitions from not
grasping to grasping a given proposition while one’s (relevant) beliefs remain
constant. Non-grasping cases are cases in which one is in practice unable to
grasp a given proposition. Jane’s is a transition case (she transitioned from
merely believing the proposition <Smoking is bad for me> to grasping it).
Here are more transition cases:
Small scale models. In school, I learned that the volume of the Sun is
about 1,300,000 times the volume of the Earth. While I had no problem
learning this fact, I had difficulty grasping it. But my grasp of this fact
improved when I encountered the analogy that compares the Sun-Earth pair
with a basketball and an apple seed. According to this analogy, the relation
between the volume of the Sun and the volume of the Earth is the same as
the relation between the volume of a basketball and the volume of an apple
seed. This analogy is particularly helpful if one visualizes an apple seed and
a basketball next to each other. As soon as one performs this visualization,
one seems to acquire a better grasp of the relative sizes of the Sun and the
Earth. The same holds of many other small scale, visualizable models that
we use in science and education. Visual models illustrating the relative sizes
of various large magnitudes are popular Internet memes because they play
an important role in helping us grasp these proportions.
The opaque proof. You are trying to understand a proof. You know
(because you have been told by someone you trust) that the conclusion follows
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from the premises. You have gone through all the steps of the derivation.
Still, you don’t really see how the conclusion follows from the premises. At
last, after going through the steps numerous times, you finally see it. Here
the proposition grasped is along the lines of <such and such follows from
such and such>.5
Sensible properties. Before she leaves the black-and-white room, Jack-
son’s (1982) Mary has never experienced redness, whether in perception or
in imagination.6 She might know (and hence believe) propositions such as
<Ripe tomatoes are red>, but it seems natural to suppose that she does not
really grasp them.7 It seems equally natural to suppose that Mary acquires
a better grasp of such propositions upon leaving her room and experienc-
ing redness for the first time. Plausibly, Mary transitions from not grasping
to grasping with the help of perceptual experience. Parallel cases involving
different perceptible qualities are easy to imagine. For example, it seems
5Grimm (2006) uses similar examples to argue that grasping is not a kind of belief. See
also Chudnoff (2015; 2013b).
6As Jackson notes in a follow-up discussion (Jackson 1986), this is not an essential
feature of the thought experiment for his purposes. Nevertheless, this feature is relevant
to my purposes: the story I am interested in is one involving a physically omniscient
person who has never experienced red in any way.
7Knut Nordby, a complete achromat, agrees with this gloss on the condition he shares
with Mary before her release: “Although I have acquired a thorough theoretical knowledge
of the physics of colours and the physiology of the colour receptor mechanisms, nothing of
this can help me to understand the true nature of colours.” (Nordby 1990)
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that one cannot grasp propositions involving olfactory or auditory properties
without having experienced these properties.
Note that physicalism naturally leads to the view of Mary’s situation I am
proposing. Physicalists are committed to denying that Mary learns anything
upon experiencing red for the first time, but they generally agree that Mary
was missing something. What Mary was missing is usually characterized as
a “way of knowing.” This is the widely endorsed “old fact, new way” reply to
Jackson’s argument (see Alter & Walter 2007). It seems natural to explain
this way of knowing in terms of grasping: what happened to Mary upon
seeing red for the first time is that she grasped the nature of redness, a nature
that she already knew but could not grasp.8 Physicalists have offered various
accounts of the way of knowing that Mary was missing. These accounts are
consistent with the preceding suggestion, as one might say that they are
in fact accounts of this instance of grasping. Indeed, several of the accounts
that have been proposed correspond to possible theories of grasping discussed
below.9 If all this is correct, the physicalist view of Mary’s predicament both
8I take grasping the nature of redness to be equivalent to grasping propositions involving
redness.
9According to the leading account of the new way of knowing gained by Mary, this
way of knowing is characterized by the involvement of concepts that depend on relevant
phenomenal experiences (see Loar 1997, Tye 1999, and Papineau 2006). The phenomenal
theory of grasping to be discussed later in effect claims that such concepts play a role
not just in grasping perceptual contents or facts about consciousness, but in every case
of grasping. Hill’s (1997) proposal might fall under the broad umbrella of the inferential
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suggests that Mary failed to grasp something while in the black-and-white
room and lends support to the claim that there can be knowledge without
grasping in such cases as Mary’s. Of course, dualists can also agree with my
view of Mary’s situation, but dualism does not provide an incentive to accept
it.
The preceding examples all involve transitions from not grasping to grasp-
ing where (on many views at least) relevant beliefs remain constant. By
contrast, the following are examples of non-grasping cases, cases in which a
proposition is known but not fully graspable, at least in practice:
Poverty statistics. Even though poverty statistics are staggering and well
known in wealthy countries, their effect on the average person appears to
be negligible. Fundraisers know this. This is why they present us with pic-
tures and rich descriptions of individuals in need instead of relying merely
on statistics. It is interesting that images are more persuasive than global
statistics even though they have much weaker relevant contents (the typical
images presented for fundraising purposes tell us at most that a few individ-
uals are suffering, while the statistics tell us that millions are).10 Imagery is
more effective even though weaker in content than global statistics because,
theory to be discussed below, but it also contains elements of the phenomenal theory.
10Note that the relevant contrast here is not that between being told about far-away
poverty and being literally faced with someone in need. That is, the contrast is not the
one at the center of Peter Singer’s master argument in The Life You Can Save (2009) and
other works.
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unlike global statistics, its contents can be grasped. Propositions such as
<millions of individuals die of poverty every year> seem to be examples of
ungraspable (or hardly graspable) propositions.
Four-dimensional shapes. Four-dimensional shapes such as the tesseract
(the four-dimensional analog of the cube) don’t seem to be fully graspable by
average individuals under normal conditions. Put in terms of propositions,
there seem to be propositions of the form <o is a tesseract> that most
people do not have the ability to fully grasp. Even if one knows that a
tesseract is the four-dimensional analog of a cube and one can reason about
tesseracts by analogy with cubes, it still seems that a full grasp of such four-
dimensional figures eludes us. If this example is not fully convincing, consider
6-dimensional figures. It seems that the harder a figure is to visualize, the
harder it is to grasp.
Large magnitudes. Large magnitudes seem to be ungraspable in them-
selves. Consider for example the volume of the Sun, which is about 1.412×
1018 km3. Earlier, we saw that small scale models such as the apple seed and
the basketball can help us grasp the relation between the volume of the Sun
and the volume of the Earth, but this does not help us grasp the absolute
volume of the Sun. Though I might know the proposition <The volume of
the Sun is 1.412× 1018 km3> and be able to use it in various calculations, I
do not seem to really grasp it. Intuitively, for all that I grasp with my mind,
the numeral “1.412×1018” could stand for a different number. It could stand
for the number that “1.412× 1019” actually stands for and this would make
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no difference to what is running through my mind.
Generally speaking, it seems that when we do what we would describe as
thinking about large numbers, what we grasp is closer to numerals than to
numbers. This is supported by the observation that arithmetic facts can be
more or less obvious depending on the notation used. For example, 7×100 =
700 is easy to see when expressed in decimal notation, but it is much less
obvious when written in base 2 (111× 1100100 = 1010111100). If one knows
both notations, one knows what proposition is expressed in either case. Yet
one might have difficulty seeing that the proposition is true in the binary
case while having no trouble seeing that it is true in the decimal case. The
reason for this is that we do not check such equalities by checking the relation
between the numbers themselves, but by checking that the written symbols
satisfy certain rules. In this case the rules of the decimal system happen
to be easier to apply.11 If we grasped the numbers themselves, the equality
would be equally obvious in both cases. This suggests that, by and large,
we do not grasp arithmetic facts involving large numbers, but mere symbols
and rules that allow us to emulate thinkers that grasp these facts.12 At best,
we grasp large numbers very weakly or imperfectly (maybe approximately)
while using the symbols and rules that we grasp well to help us along in our
11Sometimes the binary system is easier to use. For example, 1111× 10000 = 11110000
is easier to see than 15 × 16 = 240 if one knows that one can use the “copy the zeroes”
rule in the binary case as well.
12See footnote 39 for a brief discussion of more evidence for this view.
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attempts to reason correctly about these numbers.
All of the preceding transition and non-grasping cases illustrate the pres-
ence or absence of the same phenomenon. This is easiest to see once we distin-
guish between two different kinds of grasping: occurrent and non-occurrent
grasping. This distinction is analogous and related to the distinction between
occurrent thoughts and non-occurrent propositional attitudes, so I will first
explain how I understand the latter.
The notion of an occurrent thought is best conveyed by examples. Exam-
ples of situations in which we have occurrent thoughts include those in which
something occurs to us suddenly (I left my wallet in the car! ), those in which
we are thinking through a problem, and those in which we are talking to
someone and reflecting on what is being said. In these situations, we can ob-
serve non-dispositional judgments or judgment-like thoughts that typically
last a brief moment. By occurrent thoughts, I mean mental events of this
kind. Inevitably, the occurrent thoughts with which we are most intimately
acquainted are ones we are aware of having, but we cannot rule out that
thoughts of this kind can also exist without our being aware of them.
In contrast with occurrent thoughts, non-occurrent propositional atti-
tudes tend to persist independently of what is going through one’s mind. The
prime examples of non-occurrent propositional attitudes are non-occurrent
beliefs and desires. Typically, ascriptions of beliefs and desires are ascriptions
of non-occurrent beliefs and desires.13 For example, if I say that you believe
13Here I am allowing for the possibility that there are occurrent beliefs and desires, but
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that monkeys like bananas, I am ascribing to you a state that is largely in-
dependent of what is running through your mind at any given time. This
state is a non-occurrent belief. Arguably, a non-occurrent belief that P is
nothing more than a disposition to have occurrent thoughts to the effect that
P whenever one rationally ought to have these thoughts. For example, if one
non-occurrently believes that P, then one will be disposed to occurrently
think P when P has implications for what one is currently thinking about.
Grasping also seems to come in occurrent and non-occurrent varieties.
In all our transition cases, we can identify brief moments when the subject
gets it or sees it. These are episodes of occurrent grasping (in addition to
being episodes of occurrent thought). If I show you a visual model of the Sun
and the Earth, for example, you will have a clearly identifiable, short-lived
episode during which you will have a special grip on the relation between their
sizes. When Mary stepped out of the black-and-white room and saw a red
object for the first time, there was a brief moment when she first understood
what red objects are like. In the proof case, there is a moment when you see
that the conclusion follows. Our cases also illustrate non-occurrent grasping.
After Mary has seen red objects for the first time, there is a sense in which
she grasps the nature of redness whether or not she is occurrently having any
I don’t really think there are such states. I agree that there are belief-like occurrent states,
namely, judgments. However, I don’t think we should count judgments as beliefs because,
as I suggest below, judgments are very different from the paradigmatic beliefs, which are
non-occurrent.
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thoughts or experiences (she continues to grasp the nature of redness even
when sound asleep). The kind of grasping that Mary now has persistently is
non-occurrent grasping. Arguably, to say that Mary non-occurrently grasps
the nature of redness is to say that she is disposed to occurrently grasp it
as required. More generally, it seems that non-occurrently grasping P is
simply a matter of being disposed to occurrently grasp P as required. This
view, which mirrors the above view of non-occurrent belief, gives explanatory
priority to occurrent grasping over non-occurrent grasping. Partly because
I find this view plausible and partly because I cannot discuss both kinds of
grasping at length here, I will focus mainly on occurrent grasping in what
follows, and I will assume that something like the dispositional view of non-
occurrent grasping is correct.
The preceding examples illustrate other important features of grasping
aside from the applicability of the occurrent/non-occurrent distinction. First,
grasping seems to be a purely mental phenomenon that is independent of
one’s epistemic state. In all transition cases above, no change in the epistemic
status (truth, justification, etc.) of the subject’s beliefs is required for the
subject to grasp their contents. In addition, it is clear that one can grasp
propositions that are false or unjustified or otherwise epistemically defective.
For example, you would not have to withdraw your claim that you grasp
Goldbach’s conjecture upon learning that it is false and was poorly justified
all along. So it seems that grasping is independent of such epistemic factors
as justification and truth. We can, in any case, distinguish a purely mental
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component to the state salient in the above cases. That is what I mean by
“grasping.”
Second, grasping a proposition seems to improve our ability to make use
of it in reasoning and decision-making. For example, Jane knew all along
that smoking was bad for her, but it was only when she grasped this fact
that her actions began to reflect its implications and she stopped smoking.
Similarly, knowing that millions of people die of preventable poverty every
year does not move us to action as much as grasping the fact that a few
individuals might die of poverty. It seems that grasping a fact helps us take
it into account when forming action-causing intentions. This observation
is related to the role of grasping in underpinning understanding mentioned
in the introduction. Arguably, it is because grasping enables us to reason
competently with a proposition that it can underpin understanding.14
It may be suggested that, in some cases at least, it is not an improved
grasp that explains the change in behavior, but an emotional reaction. In the
case of poverty statistics, for example, one might say that the reason imagery
leads to action is not that it enables us to better grasp relevant facts, but
that it triggers an emotional response. In Jane’s case, one might think that
what really moved Jane to action are the emotions that were elicited when
she learned that her colleague had cancer.
In the case of poverty statistics, the emotional responses in question can-
not be part of how we explain our reaction to fundraisers’ messages because
14Grimm (2006) also makes this point.
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they are part of the reaction we are trying to explain. When they are effec-
tive, pictures of individuals in need elicit feelings of sympathy in potential
donors, and these feelings lead to action. This is precisely the response that
should be evoked by poverty statistics as well. What we want to know is why
we have this emotional response to pictures but not to statistics even though
the former have much weaker relevant contents. One possibility is that we
are (extremely) morally inconsistent, but I don’t find this plausible. I find it
more plausible that our responses vary because what our minds are presented
with—what we grasp—varies. It is not so much that we are inconsistent but
that the facts do not fully enter our minds unless presented in graphic detail.
Jane’s case is slightly different. Here, unlike in the case of poverty statis-
tics, part of Jane’s emotional reaction has an obvious explanation that has
nothing to do with grasping something that was previously believed: she was
saddened by the news that her colleague had cancer. One might think that
this emotional response is what explains Jane’s change of mind.
I agree that it is possible for an emotional response to directly influence
behavior without the intermediary of grasping. However, it is also possible
(and perhaps more typical) for an experience such as Jane’s to lead to a
change of behavior by improving the subject’s grasp of key facts. Jane’s case
is supposed to be one of this kind.15
Another feature of grasping made salient by the preceding examples is
15One variant on this explanation would be that the emotion somehow involves a grasp
of new facts. A related view of emotions is defended by Starkey (2008).
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that it seems to be associated with phenomenal consciousness, the subjec-
tive, experiential, “what it’s like” aspect of mental states exemplified by such
states as experiences of colors, sensations of pains, emotional feelings, con-
scious thoughts, and mental imagery.16 Grasping is closely associated with
phenomenal consciousness in two of the transition cases discussed above: in
the case of small scale models, considering an easily visualizable model such
as the apple seed and the basketball seems to help us grasp the relative sizes
of the Earth and the Sun; in the Mary case, being able to phenomenally
experience a sensible property seems to be necessary in order to grasp it.
The precise role of experience is less clear in the proof case, but it does
seem like there is a phenomenological change when the parts snap together.
Jane’s case is not described in sufficient detail for us to know what she ex-
perienced when, but we can easily imagine her going through what was for
her a novel phenomenological episode when she made up her mind about
quitting smoking. So our transition cases illustrate at least a rough correla-
tion between consciousness and grasping. Failures to grasp in non-grasping
cases also seem to at least roughly correlate with the lack of an ability to
16There is another sense of “conscious” or “consciousness” that should be distinguished
from phenomenal consciousness. In this other sense, a state is conscious when one is
aware of being in it. A state that is conscious in this sense need not be phenomenally
conscious. For example, it could be a belief lacking phenomenal character. In this paper
I am mainly interested in the relevance of phenomenal consciousness to grasping, so when
I say “conscious” I normally mean “phenomenally conscious.” Nagel 1974, Chalmers 1995,
and Block 1995 are good introductions to the concept of phenomenal consciousness.
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have relevant episodes of phenomenal consciousness: one cannot concretely
imagine, perceive or otherwise experience tesseracts, extreme magnitudes,
and facts on the scale of worldwide poverty. There is at least a rough, prima
facie correlation between the availability of relevant episodes of phenomenal
consciousness and the capacity to grasp a given content.
One question is whether grasping is an all-or-nothing matter or a matter
of degree. Some of our transition cases seem to illustrate partial grasping, for
example, the apple seed/basketball model. On the face of it, such a model
gives one a better grasp of the relation between the volumes of the Sun and
the Earth, but it does not give one a full grasp of precisely this relation.
What one grasps is a little more vague than the relation x is 1,300,000 times
bigger than y. Likewise, the non-grasping cases above are arguably cases in
which one has a poor grasp of certain facts, not cases in which one has no
grasp at all. On the face of it, grasping appears to come in degrees.
The fact that non-occurrent grasping is a matter of being disposed to
occurrently grasp a certain proposition is sufficient to make it graded: one’s
disposition to grasp a proposition occurrently can be more or less robust,
and a more or less robust disposition will confer one a more or less good
non-occurrent grasp of the proposition. To my mind, it is less clear whether
occurrent grasping is also graded. There is a prima facie case for partial
occurrent grasping because it is natural to speak as if occurrent grasping
were graded in such cases as those just mentioned, but I don’t think we
should give too much credence to this evidence in assessing the deep nature
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of grasping. It might well be that the way we are inclined to speak does not
reflect nature’s joints. I will return to this topic in section 4.
2 Theories of grasping
In the preceding section, we saw that grasping is associated with phenomenal
experiences and effects on reasoning and behavior. It is natural to look for
an account of grasping in these associated phenomena.
Consideration of the role of grasping in reasoning and behavior suggests
an inferential theory of grasping. On this theory, grasping a proposition is
a matter of having a thought that represents the proposition and is suitably
connected to other mental states through inference-like dispositions. Most
of the accounts of grasping that have been discussed in the literature are
variants on this view. Wilkenfeld (2013) suggests that “understanding x in-
volves possessing a representation of x that could be manipulated in useful
ways,” where the manipulations are mental manipulations.17 Kvanvig (2003,
p. 200) suggests that grasping involves an ability to answer a certain range of
questions about what is grasped. Nida-Rumelin (2006) offers an account of
grasping in terms of idealized abilities to identify counterfactual extensions
given sufficient information.18 Grimm (2011) offers the following account of
17While Wilkenfeld is nominally talking about understanding, I believe his target is
what I call “grasping.”
18Nida-Rumelin’s is an account of the grasping of properties, but it is straightforwardly
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how we grasp structures:
“Grasping” a structure would therefore seem to bring into play
something like a modal sense or ability—that is, an ability not
just to register how things are, but also an ability to anticipate
how certain elements of the system would behave, were other
elements different in one way or another. (2011, p. 12)
The analog of this account for propositions would be that grasping a propo-
sition is a matter of being able or disposed to reason suitably about the
implications between the proposition and other propositions.19 All of the
preceding views fall under the umbrella of the inferential theory so long as
we understand the inferential dispositions figuring in the latter sufficiently
broadly. Since everything I have to say about the inferential theory can
straightforwardly be applied to these versions of the theory, I will not discuss
these views individually.
Consideration of the apparent connection between grasping and phenom-
enal consciousness suggests a phenomenal theory of grasping. The cases dis-
cussed in the preceding section exemplify at least a rough correlation be-
tween the ability to grasp a certain content and the ability to have related
phenomenal experiences. This suggests a view according to which grasping
extended to the grasping of propositions. I discuss this account in more detail below.
19However, Grimm seems to think that only non-propositional objects can be grasped,
so he might not agree with this account.
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constitutively involves phenomenal consciousness. Whereas the inferential
theory takes the inferential role of grasping to indicate that it is inferential
in nature, the phenomenal theory takes its apparent connection to phenome-
nal consciousness to indicate that it is phenomenal in nature. I am not aware
of any clear endorsement of the phenomenal theory in the contemporary lit-
erature.20
Two other theories might initially seem attractive. The first is that grasp-
ing is simply a matter of occurrent thinking: the difference between grasping
20Chudnoff’s (2011b, 2011a, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e) perceptualist theory of intuition is
the view that comes closest to the phenomenal theory of grasping. Chudnoff argues that
intuiting that P is experiencing P ’s truth together with a truth-maker for P. Intuition
and grasping are not the same thing: we grasp propositions all the time without intuiting
their truth. However, when we intuit the truth of a proposition, part of what is going on,
at least if one is having a full-blown intuition of the kind discussed by Chudnoff, is that
we grasp it.
While the phenomenal theory has few contemporary proponents, it has had many ad-
herents in the empiricist and phenomenological traditions. Russell, for example, famously
held that “Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of con-
stituents with which we are acquainted” (1910, p. 159). Assuming that acquaintance
is a matter of having phenomenally experienced a content or entity, this “fundamental
epistemological principle” might reasonably to be taken to express something like the phe-
nomenal theory explored below. Of course, the theory that interests me here does not
build in the additional claims that made Russell’s logical empiricism indefensible: it is
not an epistemological theory, and it does not take a restrictive view of the contents of
experience or acquaintance.
21
and not grasping something that one knows is the difference between oc-
currently and non-occurrently thinking something that one knows. I suspect
that part of the reason why grasping has received little attention is that many
tacitly assume that this theory is correct. But grasping cannot be equated
with occurrent thought, because there are cases that involve one without the
other (and vice-versa). As noted earlier, it makes sense to say that Mary
grasps the nature of the color red even when she is unconscious and cannot
have any occurrent thoughts. It is true that many of the paradigm cases of
grasping involve sudden realizations that involve occurrent thoughts, but not
all do. Conversely, it is possible to occurrently think a proposition without
grasping it. For example, before learning about her colleague’s cancer, Jane
was able to occurrently think that smoking was bad for her even though she
did not grasp this proposition.
The second theory is that grasping a proposition is a matter of repre-
senting it under the right mode of presentation (MOP). The standard un-
derstanding of MOPs is as whatever it is that explains cognitive significance
(e.g. the cognitive significance of “Hesperus = Phosphorus”) (c.f. Schiffer
1990). On this understanding of MOPs, the claim that grasping is a mat-
ter of representing a proposition under the right MOP amounts to the view
that whatever explains cognitive significance also explains grasping. To get
a theory of grasping out of this view, we need to supply a theory of cogni-
tive significance. All extant theories of cognitive significance, from Fodor’s
(1998) to Chalmers’ (2002; 2004; 2006a; 2012), explain it in terms of inferen-
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tial role, broadly construed.21 As a result, this way of understanding MOPs
and cognitive significance yields inferential accounts of grasping (with some
additional claims about MOPs and cognitive significance). By and large,
the considerations for and against inferential theories discussed in this pa-
per also apply to inferential theories obtained through this route (sometimes
with minor adaptations). I won’t go into much detail regarding inferential
theories of this kind because they seem to be among the least promising of
inferential theories. The reason is that grasping as we conceive of it here
distinguishes between two different ways of having the same belief. In con-
trast, cognitive significance, as normally understood, is supposed to provide
an individuation criterion for MOPs that reflects sameness and similarity of
21Fodor’s view is that the syntactic features of Mentalese symbols explain cognitive
significance; however, he also holds that these features are individuated by inferential
role, so the theory is ultimately inferential. As far as I can tell, the same holds of other
Mentalese accounts of cognitive significance.
Chalmers (2002) suggests that modes of presentation are epistemic intensions. His ac-
count of epistemic intensions is roughly as follows: a representation’s epistemic intension
is the function from scenarios to extensions that characterizes what the user of the rep-
resentation is disposed to identify as its extension at the scenario purely on the basis of
idealized a priori reasoning (Chalmers 2006b, section 3.4). A theory of grasping built on
this view of MOPs would explain grasping in terms of idealized inferential dispositions
rather than actual inferential dispositions. Most of the general considerations for and
against inferential theories discussed here also apply to views of this sort. Nida-Rumelin
(2006) explores the prospects for an account of grasping in terms of epistemic intensions.
Her views are discussed below.
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belief or belief content. As a result, it seems unlikely that inferential MOPs
that reflect cognitive significance will be sufficiently fine-grained to explain
grasping.
As far as I can tell, the only alternative to the understanding of MOPs
in terms of cognitive significance is to understand them as the things that we
grasp when we think. I find this way of thinking of MOPs attractive, but
it makes grasping explanatorily prior to MOPs, so it cannot help us explain
grasping.
3 The inferential theory
Let us begin our assessment of the inferential theory by restating it a lit-
tle more precisely. The following seems to capture the core idea without
significant loss of generality:
The Inferential Theory: An occurrent thought t with content P is an oc-
current grasping of P to the extent that t is appropriately inferentially
connected to other mental states of the subject.
Three features of this theory should be pointed out immediately. First, the
theory says nothing about non-occurrent grasping. The reason for this is that
non-occurrent grasping can be explained in terms of dispositions to grasp
occurrently (or so I assume). Second, this theory takes occurrent grasping to
be a graded phenomenon. For reasons that will become evident shortly, it is
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very difficult to produce a satisfactory formulation of an ungraded inferential
theory. Third, the relevant inferential role should here be taken to include all
inference-like causal relations between mental states, including a thought’s
causing the formation of an intention. If we did not count intentions as
part of inferential role, the inferential theory would be unable to explain
Jane’s behavior, because Jane was always as good as anyone at describing
the possible effects of smoking and drawing all the relevant conclusions. The
only inferences that were missing in Jane’s case were inferences between
thoughts and intentions.22
Perhaps the most obvious difficulty with the inferential theory is that it
is hard to see how the inferences that are relevant to grasping a proposition
might be specified. As stated above, the theory is not entirely clear regarding
the manner in which the extent of one’s grasp of P varies with the inferential
role of t. The problems start when we try to make the theory a little more
precise on this score.
Let us refer to the set of propositions entailed by P as the consequences of
P. A natural way to precisify the inferential theory is to say that the extent
to which one grasps P is equal to the proportion of the consequences of P to
22In this paper, I use the term “intention” in such a way that intentions are action-
causing, in the following sense: as long as the mind-body connection works as it should,
an intention will result in an action.
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which t is connected.23 For example, if one can infer 10% of the consequences
of P, then one has a 10% grasp of P.
While natural, this proposal faces an obvious problem. Any proposition
has infinitely many consequences of arbitrary complexity.24 Because the brain
is a finite device with finite storage and a finite number of possible states, the
number of inferences that one is in a position to draw from any proposition at
any given time is finite. Since the result of dividing a finite number by infinity
is undefined, the extent to which one grasps any proposition is undefined on
the present understanding of the inferential theory.
This specific problem can be circumvented by using better mathematics,
but we land in an equally unacceptable position. To avoid an undefined ratio,
we can take the extent to which one grasps P to be the limit of the ratio
of the number of valid inferences one can make to n as n tends towards the
number of the consequences of P. However, since the consequences of any
P form an infinite set and the number of inferences one can make is finite,
this limit is zero for any P. Again, this not an acceptable result: the theory
predicts that no one ever grasps anything at all.
If there is a solution to this problem, it requires idealizing away from
the limitations of human brains. Perhaps there is a sense in which one is in
23We might also want to take into account the “inputs” to t and require that t does not
lead to too many invalid inferences, but these complications make no material difference
to the main points I want to make.
24This is true of both necessary and contingent consequences.
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a position to infer an infinite number of consequences of P under suitably
idealized conditions. The difficulty is that it is unclear how to specify plau-
sible idealizations. If the relevant ideal conditions are those in which one is
perfectly rational and logically omniscient, then it will always be the case
that one can infer all the consequences of P in ideal conditions, so it will be
impossible to fail to fully grasp any proposition that one can think.25 This
is not an acceptable result since it is obvious that we often fail to fully grasp
25Nida-Rumelin’s (2006) account of grasping (an application of epistemic two-
dimensional semantics) is an example of an idealized inferential theory that faces this
problem. Nida-Rumelin avoids the problem by stipulating that only inferences that are
warranted by information the subject grasps count, but this makes her account circular,
as she acknowledges:
... an epistemic subject S grasps a property via a concept C if and only if S
can in principle (under ideal cognitive conditions) correctly decide whether
an individual A falls under the concept C when S is given all the relevant
information about A in terms of concepts that allow A to grasp the properties
expressed by these concepts. The case where the concept C is used in the
description is not excluded. The account of grasping a property is circular.
But since the account is not intended as a definition, the circularity is not
vicious.
As she explains later in the paper, Nida-Rumelin doesn’t find this circularity vicious
because her project is merely to regiment grasping talk in the same way that the symbol
“∧” in logic regiments the intuitive concept and. But what we are looking for here is not
merely a regimentation of grasping talk. We are looking for an explanation of grasping,
and circularity is vicious in explanations.
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propositions that we believe. It is very difficult to see what other idealizations
might be relevant.
Another problem with the inferential theory is that inferential role (how-
ever we understand it exactly, within reason) seems to be neither necessary
nor sufficient for grasping. The insufficiency of inferential role for grasping
is clearly illustrated by the case of large magnitudes. I can draw numerous
inferences from the proposition <the Sun has a volume of 1.412×1018 km3>:
I can infer that the Sun has a volume greater than 1.3× 1018 km3, that the
Sun has a radius of more than 100,000 km, and so on. I can also draw non-
deductive inferences. For example, I can infer that the Sun is larger than my
house, that I could not eat the Sun, and that the Sun would make a bad ten-
nis ball. The relevant deductive and non-deductive inferences that I am in a
position to make can be multiplied ad nauseum. I am also able to behave as
required by such reasoning when relevant. My behavior and inferences with
regard to the proposition that the volume of the Sun is 1.412 × 1018 km3
are about as rational as can be expected of anyone towards any empirical
proposition they believe, yet, intuitively, I do not really grasp how big the
Sun is.
The case of sensible properties also suggests that inferential role is insuffi-
cient for grasping. Individuals who have no ability to experience colors need
not be in any way restricted in the inferences they can draw about colors.
First, nothing stops them from thinking about colors. (When an achromat
asks for a red shirt, their request really does express a desire for a red shirt.)
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Second, sufficient knowledge of the relationships between colors and other
properties could in principle confer to achromats inferential and behavioral
abilities at least comparable to those of normally sighted individuals. An
achromat could easily be able to draw more inferences about colors than a
normally sighted individual.26 This again seems to show that a thought’s
playing a certain inferential role is not sufficient for grasping, however we
choose to specify the relevant inferential role.
26One might say that achromats are limited in the inferences they can draw because
they are unable to think certain contents having to do with what it’s like to experience
red things. This line of response would require the inferential theory to be supplemented
with some criterion that would tell us which valid inferences are relevant to grasping
a proposition. Without such a criterion, achromats’ putative inability to think about
what it’s like to see something red does not block the objection, because an achromat
might still have more extensive inferential abilities with respect to colors than a normally
sighted individual. Another response, one that may not be acceptable to everyone, is
that achromats can think about what it’s like to see red. Just say that we call R the
phenomenal character of red experiences. Suppose we have informed achromats that we
use R in this way. Even if they did not grasp the full meaning of R, achromats could
use this term deferentially. They could think to themselves such thoughts as <Red things
cause R experiences> and <If a fire truck turns up, it will cause R experiences>. They
could connect arbitrarily many such thoughts with just about any other thoughts. They
could, in this manner, draw inferences connecting all relevant contents. They could do this
without ever grasping the nature of R or the color red. This seems to show that inferential
and behavioral dispositions are not sufficient to grasp a content. Bealer (2000, pp. 39-40)
makes a similar point.
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One might think that this objection merely shows that the inferential
theory needs to be supplemented by a condition pertaining to modes of pre-
sentation. It is natural to suppose that achromats refer to colors by deferring
to normally sighted individuals or by description. This might seem to imply
that their color thoughts have MOPs that are not suited to grasping facts
about colors. We saw earlier that our options for an explanation of MOPs are
limited to grasping and inferential role. If we take MOPs to be the things we
grasp, then it is clearly true that grasping a proposition requires represent-
ing it under the right MOP (the proposition itself), but this understanding
of MOPs does not provide an additional condition that can be added to the
inferential theory. If we take MOPs to be inferential roles, the claim that one
must represent a proposition under the right MOP in order to grasp it does
not add anything beyond what the inferential theory already says. Either
way, the inferential theory cannot be improved by adding to it a condition
pertaining to MOPs.
The preceding cases suggest that inferential role is not sufficient for grasp-
ing. Other examples suggest that inferential role is not necessary. Take a
good look at the shape of this piece of paper or this screen, as the case may
be. Let us call this shape “S.” As you experience S, you have a perfect grasp
of it. Just in virtue of having S in view, you grasp S as well as anyone
could ever grasp it. You grasp what shape S is, but you need not be able to
draw any interesting inferences about it. For example, you might well not be
in a position to tell that this rectangular shape can be obtained by putting
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together two identical triangles, or that it has a larger area than a circle with
such and such radius. If you are truly weak in logic, you might fail to infer
that S is self-identical. It does not matter how obvious the inferences you
fail to draw are; as long as you see S as the shape it is, you have a perfectly
good grasp of it.
An example discussed by Strevens (originally from Lipton 2009) can also
be used to argue that inferential role is not necessary for grasping:
After playing with an orrery, I might understand why the plan-
ets sometimes exhibit apparent retrograde motion, but I may be
unable to articulate this understanding. I have to show you the
orrery; I cannot, otherwise, tell you what I learned from it. [...] I
suggest that understanding that, or grasping, a proposition does
not imply an ability to make the proposition explicit... this, I
submit, correctly describes the orrery case. (Strevens 2013)
Strevens’ point is that grasping does not imply the ability to articulate any-
thing about what one grasps. But the example shows by the same token that
grasping does not require significant reasoning capabilities: if you were able
to reason extensively about the workings of the orrery, you would be able to
articulate something about them.
Another problem with the inferential theory is that it does not, upon
closer inspection, square well with the observations that initially seemed to
support it. The inferential theory was initially motivated by the observation
that grasping seems to help us take the contents of our beliefs into account
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in reasoning (including the formation of intentions). On reflection, however,
the inferential theory does not square well with the explanatory role that
grasping plays in some of the explanations of behavior discussed earlier. A
natural explanation of why Jane did not quit smoking before hearing of
her colleague’s cancer is that she had not properly grasped the fact that
smoking was bad for her. A natural explanation of why poverty statistics
are unmoving is that hearing these statistics is not sufficient for forming a
good grasp of the facts they describe. If grasping a proposition P were a
matter of having a thought with content P that is properly connected to
other mental states through inferential dispositions, such explanations would
be circular: we would be explaining Jane’s acquisition of a disposition to
form intentions consistent with her beliefs by her acquisition of a disposition
to form intentions consistent with her beliefs. But it does not seem circular
to say that Jane began acting consistently with her belief that smoking is
bad because she improved her grasp of this fact.
Not only does the inferential theory seem to suffer from principled diffi-
culties, it seems unable to account for the transition and non-grasping cases
introduced in section 1. We have already seen that the theory fails to account
for the lack of grasping in non-grasping cases. The theory also has trouble
accounting for transition cases. The problem is that all our transition cases
exhibit large changes in grasping that are not accompanied by large changes
in inferential abilities. This seems inconsistent with the inferential theory.
Mary, for example, does not significantly improve her inferential dispositions
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upon seeing red for the first time. The inferential theory fails to predict a
significant change in her grasp of the nature of redness at that time.
In this section, we uncovered four problems for the inferential theory: it is
hard to see how the theory could be made satisfactorily precise by specifying
how the inferences that one can make affect grasping, certain cases suggest
that a thought’s playing an inferential role is neither necessary nor sufficient
for grasping, the theory seems to be in tension with one of the key explanatory
roles that grasping is supposed to play, and the theory cannot explain our
test cases of grasping and non-grasping.
4 The phenomenal theory
The phenomenal theory explains grasping in terms of phenomenal conscious-
ness, the “what it’s like” aspect of mental states. My preferred formulation of
the phenomenal theory makes reference to phenomenal experiences, which are
instantiations of phenomenal properties, which in turn are ways that things
are like for someone. The following seems to be the most natural account of
grasping in terms of phenomenal consciousness:
The Phenomenal Theory: To occurrently grasp P is to have a phenom-
enal experience with P as content.27
27Like the inferential theory, the phenomenal theory only aims to explain occurrent
grasping. Non-occurrent grasping can be explained in terms of dispositions to occurrently
grasp relevant propositions.
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According to the phenomenal theory, grasping a proposition is a matter of
having a phenomenal experience that has the proposition as its content. This
tells us what grasping is, but this leaves open what is involved in believing or
thinking something with grasping or understanding, which was our original
question. One possible view (arguably the most natural) is that to have a
thought with content P while grasping P just is to experience P. Another
view is that grasped thoughts involve experiences with relevant contents with-
out being identical to them. The choice between these two views seems to
turn more on how one wants to use the word “thought” than on what is in-
volved in grasping: unless one has reasons for not wanting to call experiences
that occur in cognition thoughts, I don’t see why one should not endorse the
first view. In any case, I will focus on the first and simpler view here.
There are a few prima facie objections that the phenomenal theory is
likely to elicit on a first hearing. It will be helpful to start by addressing
these objections, which will also allow us to better understand the theory.
Then I will look at how the theory applies to our transition and non-grasping
cases.
4.1 Prima facie objections
Objection 1: Experiences don’t have propositional contents
A likely objection to the phenomenal theory is that experiences don’t have
propositional contents. In order to properly assess the strength of this ob-
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jection, we need to get a little clearer on the notion of propositional content
relevant to the phenomenal theory.
For experiences to have propositional contents, they must have intentional
contents (whether propositional or not). The view that experiences have
intentional contents is known as intentionalism. Many different definitions
and theories of intentionality have been combined with intentionalism. For
present purposes, we can say that a mental state’s intentional content is what
it presents, is about, or is directed at. This common but hand-wavy definition
of intentional content could use some precisification, but its vagueness is not
detrimental to our purposes.28
The claim that experiences have contents in the sense of presenting things
is compatible with most theories of consciousness or perception, including
representationalism, naïve realism, and the sense-datum theory. These theo-
ries disagree about the nature of experiential contents and the nature of the
presenting relation we bear to these contents in perceptual experience, but
they agree that experiences are intentional or contentful in the weak sense
of presenting things.29 There are good objections to other, more specific un-
28One might ask why vagueness is acceptable here but not in the case of the inferential
theory. The difference is that there are promising precisifications of the notion of inten-
tionality relevant to intentionalism (see for example Pautz (2009a; 2009b; 2010a; 2010b)
and Sosa (2010, ch. 6) and Mendelovici (2010)).
29Byrne (2001) makes a similar point. Pautz (2009a; 2009b; 2010a; 2010b) and Sosa
(2010, ch. 6) argue for the kind of intentionalism that I favor (and that I also defend
in Bourget 2010b). Bourget & Mendelovici 2014 and Seager & Bourget 2007 survey the
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derstandings of the thesis that experiences have intentional contents, but it
seems hard to deny that experiences present things in some vague sense. It
is at least obvious that many experiences present things (which is all that
we need here). For example, when I look at my keyboard, I seem to undergo
an experience that presents me with a silvery rectangular shape with many
small white squares embedded in it lying on a brown surface with a certain
wood-like texture.
To say that phenomenal experiences present things is not yet to say that
some of them have propositional contents as required by the phenomenal
theory. But a suitably watered-down notion of propositional content makes
this stronger claim easy to accept once we recognize that experiences have
a presentational character. For the purposes of the phenomenal theory, we
can say that a content is propositional if and only if it is an entity of a
kind that has a proposition-like structure.30 Examples of entities that have
proposition-like structure include propositions, facts, and events (understood
as instantiations of properties). On this broad understanding of proposi-
tional contents, a typical naïve realist, who holds that veridical experiences
debates surrounding intentionalism. For what it’s worth, the only alternative to the three
views mentioned here is the qualia theory, and it accounts for only 17.3% of opinions
among philosophers of mind according to Bourget and Chalmers (2014).
30Mendelovici (forthcoming) makes a related distinction between the character and na-
ture of a content. On her account, a content might have propositional character without
being a proposition (without having a propositional nature).
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present facts, should agree that these experiences have propositional con-
tents, because facts have proposition-like structure.31 The sense-datum the-
orist, who holds that experiences present mental particulars bearing “primed
properties,” should agree that experiences have propositional contents, be-
cause particulars instantiating properties are just events or facts, which have
proposition-like structure. Again, the majority of theorists can agree with
the minimal assumptions required by the phenomenal theory.
Objection 2: Experiences are sensory, grasping is cognitive
Another likely objection is that experiences, unlike graspings, 1) do not oc-
cur as part of cognitive processes and 2) do not have abstract or complex
contents.
I reject both (1) and (2). These claims capture a conception of the mind
that confines consciousness to the sensory realm. As Siewert (2011) observes,
this conception of the mind became widespread in the wake of behaviorism
and functionalism because behavior and functional role seemed apt to ex-
plain mental facts only when consciousness is expunged from these facts.
This, of course, is not a good reason for endorsing (1) and (2), because
confining consciousness to the sensory realm does not really lessen the sever-
ity of the challenge that it poses to reductive explanation. Setting aside
this motivation, it seems obvious that there is often something it’s like to
31They can also assign propositional contents to non-veridical experiences based on what
their veridical counterparts present.
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think, and many theorists now recognize this. Cases for experiences that
have rich contents and might reasonably be said to occur as part of cognitive
processes have been made by numerous authors in recent years, including
Goldman (1993), Strawson (1994; 2000; 2004; 2005; 2011), Gopnik (1998),
Horgan & Tienson (2002), Horgan, Tienson & Graham (2003; 2004), Kriegel
(2003; 2008a; 2008b; 2011a), Pitt (2004; 2011), Farkas (2008a), Bayne (2008;
2009), Siegel (2010), Bourget (2010a), Mendelovici (2010), Giaquinto (2011),
Smithies (2011b; 2013a; 2013b), Siewert (1998, 2011), Montague (2011),
Prosser (2011), Chudnoff (2011a; 2011b; 2012; 2013a; 2015), Mendelovici
& Bourget (2013;2014), and Dodd (2014), among others.
I will call the view that rejects (1) and (2) (and so asserts that experiences
with rich contents occur as part of cognition) liberalism about phenomenal
content. It is inevitable that the plausibility of the phenomenal theory as an
alternative to the inferential theory will turn to some extent on the outcome
of ongoing debates surrounding liberalism about phenomenal content. How-
ever, the theory does not stand and fall entirely with the existing case for
liberalism. There are three reasons for this:
First, the phenomenal theory only requires the existence of cognitive ex-
periences corresponding to our grasped contents, and not all thought contents
can be grasped. Some of the most vocal proponents of liberalism seem to
believe that nearly all thought contents can be the contents of cognitive ex-
periences (c.f. Strawson 1994; 2005; 2011; Pitt 2011; and Horgan & Graham
2002). This is a highly controversial view, but the phenomenal theory does
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not require that we endorse anything like it. It only requires that we posit
cognitive experiences corresponding to grasped contents, and it is arguable
that many contents cannot be grasped, as illustrated by our non-grasping
cases. Almost all contents for which liberalism seems least plausible (for
example, large magnitudes and highly abstract notions) are contents that
are plausibly not graspable, so they are not a problem for the phenomenal
theory. On the contrary, the fact that the contents of consciousness are plau-
sibly limited is a strength for the phenomenal theory: it is what enables the
theory to explain non-grasping cases, as we will see below.
Second, the phenomenal theory allows that most of our grasped contents
are only non-occurrently grasped, which does not require us to be phenom-
enally conscious of them. Most of the time, we do not fully and occurrently
grasp the complete and precise contents that we express or may plausibly be
attributed. Imagine for example that you are in the middle of a philosophical
conversation about the alleged supervenience of the mental on the physical.
Your interlocutor suddenly asks what you mean by “the mental supervenes
on the physical.” After a pause, you might find yourself replying something
along the lines of “I mean necessarily, any two objects that have the same
physical properties have the same mental properties.” When you “unpack”
a thought in this way, it seems that you form a better occurrent grasp of
its content than you had a moment before. This process can go through
many iterations. For example, your interlocutor might ask what you mean
by “object” or “physical,” which is going to require some thought. It seems
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plausible that only limited aspects (perhaps the aspects relevant to our rea-
soning) of our thought contents are ever occurrently grasped at any point in
time, and that we can only occurrently grasp more in the kind of piecemeal
way illustrated by the preceding example.32
The third reason the phenomenal theory does not stand and fall with the
existing case for liberalism about phenomenal content is that the theory can
itself contribute to the case for liberalism. As with any theory, we should
allow that the explanatory power of the theory takes precedence over appar-
ent observations (even apparent introspective observations) that contradict
it. This stance is all the more appropriate when the apparent contradic-
tory observations can easily be explained away. It might be reasonable to
posit largely unnoticed (un-introspected) cognitive experiences if there is a
plausible explanation for why we have difficulty noticing these experiences.33
It is not hard to see how an apparent lack of cognitive phenomenology
could be explained away. Individual experiences are not intrinsically available
to reflection and reporting: for an experience S to be so available, it needs
to bear suitable connections to other parts of the mind/brain that supply
32This paragraph repurposes a line of argument that Mendelovici (2010) uses to argue
that concepts generally have simple contents that fall short of the contents we naively
attribute to them. Mendelovici (ms) also uses a parallel case to illustrate her distinction
between immediate and reflective senses.
33Pitt (ms) also suggests that there might be large amounts of inaccessible cognitive
phenomenology.
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the required memory, language, intentions, muscle control, etc.34 Otherwise,
no report or introspection can be produced. We can think of these extrinsic
connections as a complex state K(S). It is possible that K(S) is often absent.
Not only is this possible, but it seems likely that most of our cognitive
experiences must go unnoticed. K(S) is a complex state that engages in-
tentional behavior and various capacities that are more or less unique to
humans, so we should expect forming K(S) to be a cognitively demanding
task. Therefore, we should expect to be able to form K(S) for only one or
a few cognitive experiences at a time. Also, since the main purpose of cog-
nitive experiences is to think about worldly affairs, not to be thought about
through a cognitively taxing process, we should expect the brain to have a
bias toward not contemplating its own experiences.35
The preceding explanation is speculative, but the general point that we
should not expect cognitive phenomenology to be easily accessible is indepen-
dently plausible. It simply seems prudent not to have such an expectation.
Once we rid ourselves of the idea that phenomenal consciousness has to be
somehow self-intimating in a way that registers across the board in cogni-
34This is true of phenomenal states even on a self-representational theory of conscious-
ness such as Kriegel’s (2009). As far as I know, nobody disagrees with this fairly obvious
point.
35Perceptual experiences are more in need of introspection because we often need to re-
frain from taking them at face value. This requires an awareness of perceptual experiences
as representations that is not required with cognitive experiences.
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tion, there seems to be no more difficulty with unintrospectible phenomenal
experiences than unintrospectible inferences.
Objection 3: The inferential theory is more “reductive”
Since there is no satisfactory explanation of consciousness at this point in
time, the phenomenal theory does not get us very close to a final reductive
explanation of grasping. In contrast, the inferential theory seems to get us
most of the way there. This might seem to militate in favor of the inferential
theory.
I can feel the pull of these considerations, but I think they should be
resisted. There is no reason to think that theories that get us closer to a
final reductive explanation are more likely to be true than other theories.
On the contrary, the more modest theories should be more likely to be true,
in virtue of being modest. To raise one’s credence in the inferential theory
because it seems to take us closer to a final reductive explanation would be
to engage in wishful thinking.36
Objection 4: Feeling that one understands is not the same as un-
derstanding
There is a generic feeling of understanding that often accompanies thoughts
and that we feel particularly strongly when we have an aha! moment. An-
36See also Mendelovici & Bourget 2014.
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other objection to the phenomenal theory is that this feeling can come apart
from true grasping or understanding (a point made by Gopnik 1998 and
Trout 2002).
This objection does not apply to the phenomenal theory. The phenomenal
theory says that grasping a proposition is a matter of experiencing it, not of
experiencing understanding. Unless proposition P is a proposition such as <I
understand>, understanding P requires feeling P, not that you understand.
Of course, it is plausible that the generic feeling of understanding often
accompanies the grasping of various propositions. The point here is only
that it is consistent with the phenomenal theory that the former can occur
without the latter.
Objection 5: The phenomenal theory does not account for the
graded character of grasping
Another objection is that the phenomenal theory makes grasping an all-or-
nothing matter, while it seems that grasping comes in degrees.
Since experiencing P does not come in degrees, we cannot accommodate
degrees of grasping by saying that one grasps P to the extent that one is
having an experience with content P. The following seems to be the only
possible variant on the phenomenal theory that accounts for the putative
graded character of grasping:
The Phenomenal Theory (Graded): One occurrently grasps P to the
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extent that the contents of one’s experiences are relevantly similar to
P.
One difficulty with this theory is that it is very hard to see how “relevantly
similar” might be fleshed out satisfactorily. It seems natural to say that
the relevant similarity involves having the same logical structure and other
important features. But this is exceedingly vague, and it is hard to see
what else could be said. Another problem is that this theory implies that
any episode of consciousness is a grasping of a large number of different
propositions to some degree: for any proposition P that you experience,
there will be a huge (possibly infinite) number of propositions similar to P
that you grasp imperfectly. This counterintuitive consequence seems hard to
avoid. For these reasons, the phenomenal theorist seems forced to bite the
bullet and claim that the apparently graded character of (occurrent) grasping
is illusory.
While we cannot use similarity between propositions to explain grasping,
we can use it to explain why it seems natural to talk of partial graspings.
Take any case where it seems natural to say that you imperfectly grasp
a proposition, for example, the small scale model case. On the ungraded
phenomenal theory, one should say that this is a case where, strictly speaking,
you do not grasp <The Sun is 1,300,000 times bigger than the Earth> (call
this proposition P). What you grasp (i.e. experience) is not P but Q, a
distinct proposition that is similar to P. It is difficult to say exactly what
Q is because it is difficult to introspect fleeting cognitive experiences and
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describe their contents in English. However, since Q is similar to P, we
should expect someone who fully grasps Q to behave somewhat like someone
who partially grasped P (per impossibile). Given that this is so, it is not
hard to see how partially grasping P might be conflated with fully grasping
Q, especially if Q is largely inaccessible.
In what follows I will sometimes allow myself to speak of partial graspings
to facilitate the exposition, but this should be understood as a loose way of
talking about full graspings of related (but difficult to articulate) contents.
4.2 Applying the theory
Even if there are plausible answers to the most obvious objections to the
phenomenal theory, it remains to be seen whether the theory can explain our
test cases. In this section I offer a sketch of an explanation for each case
(more information would be required than we have specified or uncovered
here to fully account for each case).
Jane: Prior to hearing about her colleague’s condition, Jane believed the
proposition <Smoking is bad for me> but did not grasp it (not even non-
occurrently). According to the phenomenal theorist, the reason Jane did not
grasp this proposition is that it was not apt to enter her consciousness. Learn-
ing about her colleague’s condition changed this. One possible explanation of
this change is that learning about her colleague’s condition made Jane think
harder about the matter, which helped her form a conscious representation
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of the badness of smoking. On this explanation of events, Jane’s emotional
response discussed earlier would plausibly have contributed to focussing her
consciousness on the matter of smoking. It is not hard to see roughly how
a more detailed explanation of Jane’s behavior might be constructed along
these lines.
One might say that <Smoking> is too abstract to figure in the contents
of experiences. I don’t find it obvious that <Smoking> is too abstract to
figure in the contents of experiences, but I also don’t find it obvious that it
can figure in the contents of experiences either. As I suggested earlier, I am
not convinced that we can easily adjudicate questions about the phenomenal
contents of thought simply by introspecting. Luckily, the phenomenal theory
can accommodate this case whether or not such phenomenal contents can en-
ter human minds. If such phenomenal contents can enter human minds, then
the phenomenal theory can straightforwardly accommodate the case. If they
cannot, all that follows is that Jane at best partially grasped that smoking
was bad for her. Perhaps Jane merely grasped and experienced <Inhaling
grey stuff repeatedly is bad>, or some other content along these lines. It
seems plausible that some phenomenal content (whether or not involving
<Smoking>) can be experienced and explain Jane’s behavior. Plausibly,
what Jane had to grasp in order to change her behavior was the badness of
her action. Whether she thought of her action as smoking, inhaling grey
stuff, or something else does not matter.37
37<Badness> is a much more plausible content of experience than <Smoking>.
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The opaque proof : The phenomenal theory takes literally our intuitive
description of such a case as one where one sees that the conclusion follows
from the premises. According to the phenomenal theory, the case described
is one where you have difficulty (but finally succeed in) bringing into con-
sciousness the relationship between the conclusion and the premises. The
phenomenal theory can explain the difficulty (or ease) with which we grasp
proofs through the difficulty (or ease) of holding in consciousness all the rele-
vant rules and symbols, as well any other factors that might affect conscious
processing (for example, domain-specific abilities). It is not hard to see how
this explanation could be filled in consistently with the phenomenal theory
given more details.
Small scale models : The phenomenal theory suggests that the reason one
cannot grasp <The Sun is 1,300,000 times bigger than the Earth> without
the help of the apple seed/basketball model or similar is that one is unable
to experience this content without the help of such a model. Plausibly, the
model helps us grasp this content by supplying (either through imagination
or perception) a visual experience whose content includes the relation being
1,300,000 times bigger than (or a closely related relation). As one is experi-
encing the relative sizes of an apple seed and a basketball, one might be able
to form a further phenomenal representation with a content that “borrows”
this relation. We might gloss the content of this further representation like
this: <The Sun is that much bigger than the Earth>.
Of course, it is doubtful that the Sun and the Earth can figure in the
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contents of experience or that the precise relation being 1,300,000 times bigger
than can be experienced. One attractive view is that, rather than grasping
the contents <the Sun> and <the Earth>, we only ever grasp other contents
that serve as proxies for these contents, for example, <the big bright thing up
there>.38 Regarding the relation being 1,300,000 times bigger than, it seems
plausible that what we grasp is a slightly indeterminate or vague variant on
this relation.
Sensible properties : It is an immediate consequence of the phenomenal
theory that someone who has no ability to experience the color red, whether
in perception or in imagination, cannot grasp its nature. As a result, the
phenomenal theory can easily explain Mary’s failure to grasp the nature of
redness prior to experiencing it for the first time. Once Mary came out of the
black-and-white room and saw red things for the first time, she acquired the
ability to experience redness in imagination. Since grasping is a matter of ex-
perience, she thereby grasped the nature of redness and various propositions
involving redness, for example <Ripe tomatoes are red>.
It seems that the phenomenal theory might, if the empirical details are
38This does not commit us to descriptivism about the names “the Sun” and “the Earth,”
as what one grasps when one uses a name need not be the same as the linguistic meaning
of the name or even its meaning in one’s idiolect. Further, what one grasps need not
fix reference in the sort of way that reference is supposed to be fixed by description on
the descriptive theory of names. For example, one might hold that we typically grasp a
description when using “the Earth” but that the reference of the term is fixed causally.
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worked out, be able to explain all the transition cases discussed here. This
is a significant improvement over the inferential theory, which does not even
offer plausible sketches of explanations. Of course, we might have to take
the precise words used to describe some episodes of grasping with a grain
of salt, but minor corrections of this sort are to be expected when we move
from pre-theoretic characterizations to theories.
Compared to transition cases, non-grasping cases are easy to explain on
the phenomenal theory. Each of the non-grasping cases discussed earlier
plausibly involves a content that is not a normal content of experience. These
contents involve objects of astronomical sizes, four-dimensional figures, and
millions of people dying of poverty. It is prima facie plausible that we cannot
experience any of these contents.39 On the phenomenal theory, this explains
why we cannot grasp them. The inferential theory does much worse here.
As we saw earlier, this theory has a hard time accounting for our failing to
grasp the contents involved in non-grasping cases because we have extensive
inferential dispositions with regard to many of these contents.
One observation that the phenomenal theory cannot explain all by itself
is that grasping seems to assist (maybe underpin) some forms of reasoning.
39Extensive empirical evidence shows that we have no innate capacity to represent num-
bers beyond four, though we have some capacity to represent larger numbers analogically
and approximately (Dehaene ?, Carey 2009). Assuming that phenomenal representations
have an innate basis, this suggests that we have no ability to experience exact large num-
bers and magnitudes.
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A full explanation would probably require a more complete picture of the
role that consciousness plays in cognition than is available today. However,
it is noteworthy that many theories of consciousness attribute to it a central
role in cognition. Almost all reductive theories of consciousness tie it to
some kind of “global workspace” or “information stream” that controls high-
level decision making and reasoning.40 Put simply, consciousness seems to
be widely regarded as the engine of rational behavior. If consciousness is the
engine of reason and grasping a proposition is a matter of bringing it within
40For example, Baars’ (1997) and Dehaene & Naccache’s (2001) theories assimilate con-
scious contents with contents that are represented in a “global workspace.” Dennett (1991)
claims that phenomenal consciousness is nothing more than neural celebrity. Tye (1995;
2000) hypothesizes that phenomenal experiences are representational states that have
abstract nonconceptual contents and are poised to influence further cognition. Dretske
(1995) also reduces consciousness to representational states that are in some sense poised
to impinge on reasoning. Evans (1982) claims that (perceptual) consciousness is a matter
of sensory information playing a certain rational role. All these authors agree that phe-
nomenal consciousness plays a central role in the control of rational, reflective behavior in
normal conditions.
Milner and Goodale’s (1995) “blindsight” cases also support the claim that consciousness
plays a role in high-level cognition. They report that a lack of visual experience goes with
an inability to use perceptual information in reasoning and control of action (even if this
information remains available for motor control). Smithies (2011a) argues that such cases
show that only phenomenally conscious content can serve as a “reason that justifies the
subject in forming a belief or performing an action.” Whether or not this is true, it seems
probable that consciousness is important to the normal operation of higher reasoning.
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the purview of consciousness, we should expect grasping to play a central
role in the generation of rational behavior.
Let us take stock. The phenomenal theory says that grasping P is a
matter of phenomenally experiencing P. This theory presupposes substan-
tive views of the nature of experience (a weak intentionalism and a moderate
liberalism about phenomenal content). I have articulated minimalistic ver-
sions of these views that are sufficient to support the phenomenal theory, but
I have not tried to defend these minimalistic views. After addressing other
possible causes for concern with the phenomenal theory, I have tried to show
how this theory might, as empirical details are filled in for specific cases, be
able to explain what we can and cannot grasp in terms of what we can and
cannot experience. In some cases, a successful explanation will likely require
that we take the precise words used to describe what we grasp (for example,
“smoking is bad”) with a grain of salt because they tend to over-describe
what we experience. Still, the phenomenal theory offers a plausible sketch
of an explanation. The phenomenal theory might also offer a satisfactory
explanation of the central role of grasping in cognition if it is true that con-
sciousness is the engine of reason. Though dependent on substantive views
about the nature and role of consciousness, the phenomenal theory seems to
be more promising than the inferential theory as a framework for explaining
grasping.
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